Razones por las que la historia de la arqueología es esencial para la teoría arqueológica by Murray, Tim
21 ISSN: 1131-6993
Why the history of archaeology is essential to  
theoretical archaeology
Razones por las que la historia de la arqueología es esencial  
para la teoría arqueológica
Tim Murray
Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, la trobe university
Melbourne, Australia 3086
t.murray@latrobe.edu.au
recibido: 04-12-2012
Aceptado: 17-06-2013
abStract
This paper discusses the relationship between the historiography of archaeology and the building and evaluation of 
archaeological theory. Although it is common for archaeologists to employ partial histories of archaeology to support 
claims for significant changes to archaeological theory, it is nonetheless the case that there is strong evidence for a 
counter claim – that theoretical archaeology needs to be more strongly grounded in the history of archaeology. This 
claim is supported by a close analysis of the value of alternative histories of archaeology to demonstrate that current 
theoretical orthodoxies have histories and are not necessarily ‘natural’ for the discipline.
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reSuMen
El presente artículo analiza el papel de la historiografía de la arqueología en la construcción y evaluación de la teo-
ría arqueológica. Aunque es común entre arqueólogos utilizar la historia de la arqueología de manera parcial para 
justificar determinadas interpretaciones sobre la teoría arqueológica, en este artículo considero que existen razones 
importantes para sostener el punto de vista contrario, i.e. que la teoría arqueológica tiene que fundamentarse sobre 
la historia de la arqueología. Este punto de vista está respaldado por un análisis detallado del valor que tienen las 
historias de la arqueología alternativas para demostrar que las ortodoxias dominantes en teoría arqueológica están 
históricamente constituidas y no son necesariamente ‘naturales’.
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ing accounts that have now lurked in the literature 
for so long as to have gained almost mythological 
status, became rather more of a challenge than we 
had first thought.
A third factor has been working on two new book 
projects on the history of archaeology. The first, now 
completed, is a single-volume history Milestones in 
Archaeology (Murray 2007). Milestones seeks the 
core of the archaeological perspective over the past 
few hundred years. It is a book all about generalisa-
tions, and it takes a global view of what archaeol-
ogy has been, is, and might yet become. It is not 
an exploration of local colour and might be, I sup-
pose, considered deeply suspect by subscribers to 
postcolonial perspectives, but histories of archaeol-
ogy can hardly be all things to everyone. the local 
colour side of things is more fully addressed in the 
other project. this is a History of British Prehistoric 
Archaeology (Murray in prep.) that will chart the 
evolution of prehistoric archaeology in the british 
Isles since the Ad thirteenth century. 
The final factor has to do with problems with 
contemporary archaeological theory, both with the 
specifics of creating and applying it (in my case to 
archaeological contexts over the last two hundred 
and fifty years), as with the general discourse of 
theoretical archaeology – its abstraction, the circu-
larity of its reasoning, the instability of its concepts 
and categories, and the psychology of its practice. 
1. Some issues in contemporary theoretical 
archaeology
Over the last forty years prehistoric archaeologists 
have sought to promote or oppose a number of re-
definitions of archaeological goals and approaches 
that have emphasized, variously, the liberating or 
constraining power of critical self-reflection. In-
deed, while practitioners have continued to ex-
pand the storehouse of archaeological data, they 
have also been engaged in active investigation of 
archaeological goals and approaches, and in inten-
sifying debate over what it is proper or relevant for 
practitioners to do. Archaeology is now much more 
than a method of data collection and analysis that 
is transformed into history (or exemplifications of 
material culture theory) by the acts of comparison 
and interpretation. Archaeology is also about the 
expansion of our understanding of human nature, 
both past and present. 
As a result the ‘culture’ of archaeology, i.e. back-
ground knowledge, experience, and the givens of its 
practice, can no longer be considered to be widely 
shared among practitioners. How are we to respond 
to this? do we return archaeology to its former 
Introduction
While histories of archaeology necessarily consider 
the history of archaeological theory or ‘thought’ as 
the late bruce trigger (1987, 2006) would have it, 
the discourse of theoretical archaeology has a far 
less natural, and less productive, relationship with 
the history of archaeology. My case in this paper 
is that theoretical archaeology needs to be more 
strongly grounded in disciplinary history. Indeed I 
will sometimes throw caution to the winds and ad-
vance a still more contentious argument, being that 
theoretical archaeology needs to be more strongly 
grounded in archaeology, than it has been for much 
of the last thirty years. Along the way I will champi-
on the value of induction as a vital element in theory 
building, advocate theory building as an important but 
rarely explored consequence of theory borrowing, dwell 
on the significant difference between analogies and 
homologies in inferential reasoning, and investigate 
why it is vital that archaeological data meaningfully 
constrain interpretation, in other words why archae-
ological data are theoretically and philosophically 
consequential. All of these issues (along with a host 
of others I can only merely nod towards) I take to 
be vital elements of a philosophy of archaeology, 
which is a rather bigger canvass to work on than I 
have space for here. 
Several factors have shaped the content of this 
paper. Since the late 1980s, I have been arguing for 
the importance of the history of archaeology to the-
oretical archaeology (e.g. Murray 1987, 1990, 1996, 
1999, 2002). 5 years ago, while being interviewed 
by Gavin lucas for Archaeological Dialogues, I 
was reminded that this remains an abnormal posi-
tion in theoretical archaeology, sparking reflection 
about whether it was my problem or everybody 
else’s! (lucas 2007). Another factor stems from 
the experience of teaching theoretical archaeology 
to students at the university of peking, with my 
former colleague liu li. Our goal was to present 
a general survey, with plenty of worked examples, 
of the various strands that have made up archaeo-
logical theory since the mid-nineteenth century. the 
lectures required us to look closely at how theory is 
taught around the world. this meant trawling de-
partmental websites and the various textbooks on 
theory that have sprung up over the years. Of course 
there is tremendous variety out there, from contexts 
where instructors seem to resolutely eschew having 
any opinions, to those where there is precious little 
else beyond a post-modern stroll down the hall of 
mirrors. Striking the happy medium where students 
are educated rather than indoctrinated, and where 
instructors really understand the essence of current-
ly unfashionable approaches, as distinct from retail-
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Is there information vital to the apprehension of 
our own deeper past locked away in these different 
presents and pasts?
Notwithstanding a wide variety of answers to 
these fundamental questions, we have also long 
been aware of the methodological assumption that 
the most effective way of making the prehistoric 
past intelligible, of saturating its phenomena with 
meaning and value, has been to write the history 
of the past in terms of the concepts, categories, and 
preoccupations of the present. In this sense an intel-
ligible past is critically dependent on an intelligible 
present (see eg Stocking 1965).
Even bearing in mind the various meanings of 
the concept of uniformitarianism that argue for 
more than a purely conventional basis for interpret-
ing the nature of the past in the terms of the present 
(see e.g. bailey 1983; Hooykas 1963, 1970; rud-
wick 1971; Simpson 1970), there have long been 
doubts about whether the concepts, categories and 
methods routinely deployed to understand the pres-
ent can have their validity as bases for knowing the 
past assessed in anything other than circular terms. 
Significantly, despite the fact that observers have 
been in general agreement that such ‘structures 
of knowing’ the present are central elements of 
our structures of knowing the past, there has been 
considerable disagreement about which particular 
reading of the present is the most appropriate to the 
job at hand. the sources of divergent readings of 
the present span perspectival aspects such as dis-
ciplines or specific orientations within disciplines, 
and the interests of observers derived from a broad 
range of cultural or socio-political factors. Further-
more, these sources are in dynamic interaction, as 
disciplinary perspectives and the interests of practi-
tioners thoroughly interpenetrate each other.
If there is more than one present, there must be 
more than one past. Given the fact that the theo-
ries that help to make the present intelligible also 
impregnate the observation predicates of our ap-
proaches to the past, and recognizing that con-
structed pasts are used to support the validity of ap-
proaches to the present, it is small wonder that the 
practitioners and consumers of history, anthropolo-
gy, and archaeology have had doubts about whether 
the propriety of these alternative pasts and presents 
can be reliably assessed in ways that allow us to 
make rational and informed judgments about them. 
this sense of uncertainty is heightened by the rec-
ognition that images of the past can (and do) have 
considerable political impact in the present.
this brings me to the second point of fracture 
– the evaluation of theory and the significance of 
empirical data. Some observers have noted that 
many of these theories I have been speaking about 
status of being primarily a method for retrieving 
historical information, or do we strive to realise its 
potential to create new knowledge about human be-
ings? It seems likely that if we adopt this second 
course of action then we will need to create new 
‘cultural’ frameworks, if the discipline is to retain 
cohesion through a common sense of problem and 
purpose that overarches potentially disparate uses 
of the past or different contexts of practice.
Obtaining a clear picture of just where dispute 
and differentiation lie in contemporary archaeol-
ogy can prove to be difficult, if only because of a 
tendency to simplify or overdraw distinctions into 
‘schools’ such as processual or post-processual ar-
chaeology, or to quarantine core elements (such as 
concepts and categories) from rigorous examina-
tion. Nonetheless it seems to me that if we are to 
move forward and attempt to resolve disputes, or 
indeed, if necessary, to dismember the discipline, 
then we need to identify contemporary debates 
about concepts, epistemology and interests, to anal-
yse their rationales, and then to propose strategies 
that apply to both the ontological and epistemologi-
cal realms of archaeology.
there is no shortage of points of fracture or dis-
pute in contemporary theoretical archaeology. In 
the present context I want to focus on just a couple 
which I take to be fundamental. The first and most 
important of these is the relationship between pres-
ent and past.
It has long been understood that the past is dif-
ferent to the present, and this perception of differ-
ence is one of the spurs to the writing of history 
as well as to the practice of archaeology. Yet it has 
also long been recognized that differences between 
present and past are tempered by the fact that the 
past is in some way or another antecedent to the 
present. Consequently it has been argued that we 
are the inheritors of a rich and diverse past that in 
some way or another has helped shape the nature of 
the present itself. On the other hand there has been 
a similar recognition that the instruments we use to 
perceive the present also structure our perception 
of the past. this has prompted us to consider the 
following question: is the past thus created by the 
present, or does it have the power to turn the tables 
on the present and force a reconsideration of those 
instruments of perception?
Added to this, since the Ad sixteenth century 
and the beginning of continuous contact with the 
ethnographic ‘other’ outside the borders of metro-
politan Europe and the classical world, it has been 
acknowledged that there are a variety of presents, 
each with histories potentially different to our own. 
but how different are those presents and pasts? do 
they lie beyond the bounds of our understanding? 
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repeating the same mistakes (the doctrine of history 
repeating itself). Second, a contemplation of the 
past can serve as a focus for judging the attitudes 
and accomplishments of the present (the acquisition 
of a critical standard). third, the notion that the past 
and the present are linked as a historical process 
(understanding the history of human beings is also 
to understand human nature itself).
A discussion of the ways in which and the terms 
under which claims to knowledge of the prehistoric 
past are justified as being reliable and rational is a 
central concern of theoretical archaeology. Here too 
there are points of fracture with the bulk of discus-
sion tending to focus on the technical aspects of ex-
planatory logic (the context of justification), rather 
than a broader and deeper inquiry into the sources 
of models and approaches used by archaeologists 
(the context of discovery). My own approach flows 
from a view that both contexts are in dynamic inter-
action. I have consciously linked this discussion of 
the terms of justification to a consideration of pres-
ent fears and disputes within contemporary archae-
ology, because I will argue that those fears primari-
ly stem from a recognition among the community of 
practitioners that convincing justification is increas-
ingly difficult to achieve in a world where there is 
no determinate scientific method with fixed rational 
criteria, and where the interests of the community 
of practitioners increasingly diverge. A more com-
plete understanding of other points of fracture in 
theoretical archaeology relies on deploying the his-
tory of archaeology in our analyses.
2. How can the history of archaeology help?
Since the establishment of the three Age System 
many archaeologists have accepted that scientific 
knowledge is the most rational and reliable (hence 
meaningful) form of knowledge, and that the scien-
tific method (best seen in the practice of the natu-
ral sciences as codified by philosophers) is the true 
path to science itself. perceptions of the nature of 
scientific knowledge have changed since then, and 
archaeologists, to a greater or lesser extent have at-
tempted to keep pace with them. However, through 
all of this change and accommodation the tension 
between what archaeologists have desired to know 
of the past, and what they have considered it pos-
sible to know, has in part been constrained by their 
understandings of the nature of scientific knowl-
edge itself. Even in the post-positivist era the domi-
nant perceptions of the nature of scientific knowl-
edge held by archaeologists have come from analy-
ses of the experiences of other sciences or fields of 
inquiry, thereby perpetuating the view that scientific 
are underdeveloped, that is, that their orientating as-
sumptions are too distant from the hurly-burly of 
empirical phenomena to be effectively assessed by 
those means and are, therefore, inherently insecure 
as bases for knowledge. Others have argued that 
the validity of these assumptions can be assessed 
on theoretical grounds, denying the view that only 
knowledge derived from the observation of em-
pirical phenomena can have any worthwhile degree 
of security. Notwithstanding these differences of 
opinion, it is widely believed that the present is so 
powerful, both as an interpretative and explanatory 
standard (what is to be known and how knowing is 
to be achieved) as well as a source of models and 
inspiration, that issues of assessment are often best 
‘sorted out’ in the present.
this latter view does not imply that all historians 
and archaeologists reject the notion that historical 
and archaeological data can, by virtue of their being 
empirical phenomena, critically constrain the appli-
cation of perspectives from the present. However, it 
is also true that the past can never be known in pre-
cisely the same ways as the present. despite Collin-
gwood’s advocacy of empathetic reconstruction, re-
enacting the past is not the same as an experience 
of the present. Nowhere has that awareness been 
more powerful than in discussions of the nature and 
limitations of archaeological inference and analogy.
We have also realized that intelligibility and 
meaning have their price. two important issues, 
here phrased as questions, arise as additional points 
of fracture: 
(1) does the prehistoric past have phenom-
enal existence external to the concepts, catego-
ries, and methodologies we articulate to con-
struct it? and 
(2) Is it possible for archaeologists to con-
vincingly demonstrate that our reconstructions 
of the prehistoric past, or our determinations 
of the nature of human behaviour during pre-
history, are more than conventional fictions in 
the sense that they are both the product and the 
support of our structures of knowing the pres-
ent?
If the problematic nature of the past, its ‘pastness’ 
being in a sense also its ‘presentness’, has raised is-
sues of evaluation and ethics, it has continued to 
be the centre of discussion and debate precisely 
because of its importance. the Western intellectual 
tradition (see baumer 1977; bronowski and Ma-
zlish 1960) has continually urged the value of the 
past as an arena for the contemplation of the pres-
ent for three fundamental reasons. First, by learning 
from experience contemporary humans may avoid 
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ologists have warranted knowledge claims. It also 
becomes vital for defining disciplinary metaphysics 
and the ways in which knowledge created by ar-
chaeologists about human beings is located on the 
cognitive map of the human sciences. these new 
investigations, hardly even begun, have the clear 
capacity to increase the number of points of fracture 
within the discipline, and between archaeology and 
its cognate disciplines. by stressing that archaeo-
logical reasoning has to more closely connect with 
the phenomenology of archaeological data, and that 
it is archaeologists who in the first instance have 
to hammer out fundamental ontological and episte-
mological issues in ways that make sense to them, 
these new approaches to the philosophy of archae-
ology might well profoundly affect the discourse of 
theoretical archaeology. Indeed the ways in which 
archaeologists create and use theory become even 
more important, and the discourse of theoretical ar-
chaeology itself becomes more consequential than 
finding ways of extending the hegemony of the 
present into the past.
Note that I have not said that they must or that 
they will. let me explain why. It is perfectly pos-
sible for histories of archaeology to be written that 
tend to support the status quo, in that they might 
argue that there is no real crisis in contemporary 
archaeology, and that we can legitimately continue 
doing what we have always done, either because 
we can’t think of anything else to do (which sits 
well with the cultural traditions of archaeology) or 
that to seriously consider alternatives would make 
it more difficult to connect knowledge created by 
archaeologists to that created in cognate disciplines. 
We should never underestimate the power of the in-
ertia of tradition, but I think it is becoming clearer 
that the unity of archaeology cannot be sustained 
under our existing cultural regime, and that to stifle 
the exploration of alternatives based on different 
readings of the phenomenology of archaeological 
records, or indeed of disciplinary epistemology, 
would make the situation worse not better. Archae-
ology lost its innocence some time ago and there 
can be no going back. Going forward presents some 
interesting challenges and the history of archaeol-
ogy can help here too.
3. Hidden histories: Alternative presents and 
futures
I came to the history of archaeology through un-
dergraduate research in the history of anthropology, 
specifically the history of nineteenth century race 
theory. My first work focused on the monogenist/
polygenist debate, as exemplified by the Scottish 
knowledge is a universal kind of knowledge, exist-
ing independently of the histories of many sciences.
From the 1960s this began to change, the most 
important symptom of which has been the shift 
from logical to historical and sociological models 
of scientific epistemology. All participants in this 
critical project have been agreed that the assump-
tions that powered the logical empiricist justifica-
tion of science have been seriously disturbed by 
the proposals of Quine (1951) and duhem (1954). 
these assumptions are: naive realism, the possibil-
ity of a universal scientific language without pre-
supposition, and the correspondence theory of truth. 
Embedded in these assumptions is the notion that 
the natural sciences are different in kind from the 
‘social’ sciences. For convenience of exposition 
these assumptions can be restated as four separate 
areas of concern: the uniformity of nature, the dis-
tinction between fact and theory, the role of obser-
vation in science, and the assessment of knowledge 
claims. In all four areas, what previously seemed 
to be strong justifications for the assumptions men-
tioned above, were demonstrated to be the result of 
contingent circumstances related to the traditions of 
scientific practice. It is now accepted by the bulk of 
commentators that scientific representations are not 
simply determined by the nature of reality. thus our 
understanding of the nature of scientific explana-
tion has turned towards a historical and sociological 
analysis of the production of scientific knowledge. 
the primary impact of this reorientation has been 
a greater concern with the mechanics of convic-
tion and plausibility in the assessment of knowl-
edge claims. Historians and sociologists of science 
have sought the mechanics of legitimation and 
conviction in the institutional structures of sciences 
(government policies, scientific societies etc.), the 
background cognitive presuppositions of scientists 
that determine, to some extent, the plausibility of 
knowledge claims, and the influence of epistemolo-
gies prevailing at any time.
Archaeology has rarely figured in these studies 
primarily because historians of the discipline have 
tended to continue to conceptualize both science 
and archaeology in positivist terms. these positiv-
ist approaches have allowed scientists to see the 
history of science and the philosophy of science 
as two mutually exclusive fields of inquiry. Those 
same approaches have led to a similar pattern of 
relationship between the history and philosophy of 
archaeology. 
All this philosophy talk has some powerful im-
plications for archaeology and the psychology of its 
practice. For a start the history of archaeology be-
comes vital for defining archaeological epistemolo-
gies through an open investigation of how archae-
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rary theoretical archaeology) is much more than I 
have room discuss here, but they are more fully dis-
cussed in Milestones in Archaeology (Murray 2007). 
What I can do is to very briefly introduce the themes 
that have underwritten aspects of this inquiry under 
the very broad umbrella raised by George Stocking 
some thirty years ago. My account of the history of 
archaeology is directed towards the identification of 
enduring structures of archaeological knowledge, 
those structures that provide the criteria in terms of 
which knowledge claims are justified as being both 
rational and reliable, and that also provide practi-
tioners with the ability to distinguish meaningful 
knowledge and the relevance of models, theories 
and approaches drawn from archaeology’s cog-
nate disciplines. Stocking’s cogent summary of the 
‘ethos’ of anthropology as we have come to know it 
has been a great help here:
Another way of looking at the matter is to 
suggest that the general tradition we call ret-
rospectively ‘anthropological’ embodies a 
number of antinomies logically inherent or 
historically embedded in the Western intel-
lectual tradition: an ontological opposition 
between materialism and idealism, an episte-
mological opposition between empiricism and 
apriorism, a substantive opposition between 
the biological and the cultural, a methodologi-
cal opposition between the nomothetic and the 
idiographic, an attitudinal opposition between 
the racialist and the egalitarian, an evaluational 
opposition between the progressivist and the 
primitivist - among others (1984: 4).
Archaeology, through its close connections to 
anthropology and history, has inherited these long-
standing epistemological and ontological antino-
mies, which have at various times in the history of 
the discipline sanctioned historicist or universal-
ist, materialist or idealist, empiricist or rationalist 
emphases within practice – precisely as they have 
done in our cognate disciplines. In this view by the 
end of the nineteenth century the connections and 
distinctions between archaeology and anthropol-
ogy, and archaeology and history, had essentially 
been established. Archaeology, its conceptual field 
defined and secure within various traditions of an-
thropological and historical research, and its meth-
odology developed to a stage where the discussion 
of temporal and cultural classifications could appeal 
to a widening store of empirical phenomena, was 
free to pursue problems of largely internal moment. 
Although in the united States the predominance of 
cultural rather than social anthropology, meant that 
the boundaries between archaeology and ‘histori-
cal’ anthropology were somewhat blurred, the same 
anatomist robert Knox and his English disciple, 
James Hunt. understanding Knox’s most famous 
work The Races of Men (1850) posed significant in-
tellectual challenges, not because so much of what 
he was saying was repugnant, but because at its 
core it represented a coherent and marvellous rich 
intellectual tradition spanning anatomy, philoso-
phy, biology, ethnology, archaeology, and of course 
philology, that was radically at odds with my own 
training as an anthropologist. robert Knox’s search 
for a scientific English anthropology that was both 
polygenist and anti-evolutionist provides an excel-
lent example of how disciplines lose their histories, 
as dominant readings of disciplinary approach and 
purpose reinforce their influence through the social-
ising power of disciplinary history. 
but a case could be made that although it was 
distinctly marginal to contemporary philosophi-
cal orthodoxies in the mid- nineteenth century, 
the transcendentalism of naturphilosophie played 
a significant role in the development of ethnology 
(particularly in the construction of the concept of 
culture). A close analysis of Knox’s The Races of 
Men reveals something of the spirit that drove this 
alternative anthropology, and the conflict between 
these alternative anthropologies and archaeologies 
in mid-nineteenth century England also provides an 
opportunity to explore the ways in which the par-
ticipants sought support from science and society, 
and the conditions under which that support was 
given. I continued to explore these ideas in doctoral 
research focused on an inquiry into the authorities 
archaeologists appeal to in order to justify their 
knowledge claims in contemporary archaeology. 
the existence of such hidden histories in anthro-
pology persuaded me that such were likely to exist 
unnoticed in archaeology too, and that the natural-
ness of contemporary views of the archaeologist’s 
project was illusory. In my view denaturalising such 
views could provide a basis on which to seriously 
address problems within contemporary archaeolog-
ical theory. Historical research has helped broaden 
my approach to this problem from being narrowly 
epistemological to asking a more encompassing 
question: what makes archaeological accounts of 
the past plausible? A consideration of plausibil-
ity then led me to more detailed investigations of 
the links between archaeology, and the societies 
that sustain its practice. this, in turn, has greatly 
increased the significance of the history of archae-
ology as a primary source of information about re-
lated inquiries into disciplinary traditions and the 
‘culture’ of archaeology. 
What happened as a result of this research into 
the authority of archaeological knowledge claims 
(and related reflections on the nature of contempo-
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ticulars over the course of the twentieth century, 
continues to provide substantial aspects of the ar-
chaeological agenda and by far the most important 
body of theory used by archaeologists in their day-
to-day practice.
but it is also the case that the process of trans-
lating archaeological data into anthropological or 
historical information (or indeed of applying the 
perspectives of those disciplines to archaeological 
data) did not (and does not) always go smoothly, 
and archaeologists might have had to take serious-
ly the idea that such simple translations might be 
problematic. but has this really affected the psy-
chology of archaeological research – for example 
by increasing scepticism about the value of exist-
ing approaches?
I have sought to understand whether the plau-
sibility of archaeological knowledge claims has 
been gauged primarily in terms of determinate 
rules of scientific method, or whether the real 
determinants of plausibility were ‘cognitive’ or 
‘cultural’. It was something of a surprise to find 
that even at the high point of empiricism in the 
mid-nineteenth century where the methodological 
rhetoric held that archaeology contributed to the 
development of an approach to understanding hu-
man prehistory that explicitly shunned myth and 
the a priori in favour of the objectivity of science, 
that the performance of practitioners fell way short 
of the mark (see eg. Murray 1990). this difference 
between rhetoric and performance (especially as 
it applies to claims for the scientific or indeed the 
unscientific status of archaeology) continues to 
this day and remains mostly unremarked. the his-
tory of archaeology supports the view that practi-
tioners rarely explore the consequences of the very 
significant disconnects between the theories they 
deploy and the structural properties of the data 
they subject to analysis.
let’s take this a bit further. While histories of 
archaeology should be sensitive to histories of 
other disciplines such as anthropology and his-
tory, historians of those disciplines should also not 
ignore what is happening in archaeology. Many 
prehistoric archaeologists in the English-speaking 
world still adhere to the tenets of anthropological 
archaeology and the proposition that archaeology 
is a subset of anthropology, particularly in terms of 
the theories it deploys. Yet in recent times the nat-
uralness of this relationship has been questioned as 
practitioners begin to comprehend that the archaeo-
logical record poses significant problems and issues 
that have never been considered part of anthropol-
ogy or historiography. thus archaeologists might 
yet face the prospect that other archaeologies are 
possible and possibly desirable, and new histories 
emphasis on the writing of prehistory, and on tech-
nical matters of classification and data retrieval was 
still present.
Over the next century changes in fashion and ori-
entation in anthropology and history directly affect-
ed the interests and approaches of archaeologists 
working under the aegis of either anthropological 
tradition, and practitioners could keep pace with 
such changes in meaning by changing the terms of 
their translations of material phenomena into first, 
archaeological and subsequently anthropological, 
data. these changes were readily accomplished for 
four reasons.
a) First, archaeological data were considered to 
be impoverished testaments of human action in 
comparison with the richer data derived from 
socio-cultural anthropology. Meaning and the 
power to convince thus lay with the disciplines 
that ‘managed’ that latter data set.
b) Second, archaeological methodologies of 
description and classification were substan-
tially relative rather than absolute. Given the 
anthropological and historical construction of 
archaeological data, there were few empirical 
grounds upon which those data, of themselves, 
could seriously disturb the intentions of their 
interpreters.
c) third, despite the overt theorizing of the few, 
the bulk of archaeologists were largely implicit 
consumers of theory, devoting their energies 
to methodological and technical issues of data 
collection and classification.
d) Fourth, given the essentially empiricist 
orientation of archaeologists in the years be-
fore the 1960s theoretical disputes were either 
settled on the authority of the archaeologists 
involved, rarely explicitly discussed because 
they were considered to be speculative and 
lacking the possibility of an archaeological 
contribution to their solution, or were simply 
set aside for some future time when the data 
were in. thus, again with notable exceptions, 
few archaeologists recognized that extant con-
ceptual and epistemological relativisms within 
the source areas of archaeological theory could 
act as spurs to the development of such theory.
I have previously described the long and intense 
association between archaeology and anthropol-
ogy, and between archaeology and history as be-
ing one of enrolment and symbiosis, beginning in 
the nineteenth century when all three disciplines 
began to take on their modern forms, and conclud-
ing around the end of that century (see e.g. Murray 
1987). this association, although differing in par-
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from outside and remain as cognitively plausible 
abstractions that add little to the sum total of knowl-
edge about the past or the present, beyond the warm 
glow we get from making things intelligible. let 
me stress that I am not arguing that all archaeologi-
cal theory (to be viable) has to be generated out of 
archaeological phenomena (although I am by no 
means opposed to theory building via induction). 
Of course we have to start somewhere and it is sim-
ply silly to postulate otherwise. but there is more to 
it than this. 
We also need to understand that the current 
dominance of social theory derived from those dis-
ciplines exploring the contemporary world, is not 
natural. It is a product of history. the best place to 
start exploring this is the nineteenth century, when 
anthropology and archaeology came into being. 
Anthropology was originally conceived of as hav-
ing a four-field structure comprising prehistoric ar-
chaeology, linguistics, physical anthropology and 
social/cultural anthropology. However in practice 
social/cultural anthropology has come to dominate 
the other three, an outcome at odds with its original 
conception, which was to produce a higher order 
integration where anthropological theory would be 
the product of all these different disciplines. this 
old idea of anthropology did not privilege any one 
of those bodies of work theoretically, and you can 
see it in action if you look in the records of the roy-
al Anthropological Institute for example, for the last 
thirty years of the nineteenth century. Its first presi-
dent was Sir John lubbock, its second president 
was his son-in-law General Augustus pitt-rivers. 
throughout that period their presidential addresses 
to the institute all approach anthropology as a high-
er order integration of perspectives drawn from the 
sub-fields. However, by the end of the nineteenth 
century the presidential addresses are all about the 
individual interests of the presidents, and which 
particular anthropological group they are represent-
ing. 
the possibility of alternative approaches to those 
that currently dominate our discipline makes it at 
least possible that archaeological theories can be 
built that do not violate the structural properties of 
archaeological phenomena, or suppress the ways 
in which archaeological data can be translated into 
information about human action. Indeed it is hard 
to think that archaeology can make a lasting con-
tribution to anthropological theory without doing 
this. but I think its fair to say that our colleagues 
in social cultural anthropology will not see things 
the same way, given that it is very likely that decen-
tering the analysis of contemporary human action 
might well mean a transformation of anthropologi-
cal theory generally. On that basis it is also likely 
that might conceivably reassess the history of rela-
tions with anthropology and history will need to be 
written.
Many of these problems stem from changing 
perceptions about the phenomenology of archaeo-
logical data, or archaeological records if you will. 
these new perceptions stress that archaeological 
records are much more complex than the simplis-
tic fossil layer-cake approach that has sustained 
archaeology for so long. Flowing from Schiffer’s 
(1987) important work on formation processes 
(particularly the notion of records as palimpsests) 
and binford’s discussion of the ‘pompeii premise’ 
(1981), time perspectivism as first proposed by 
bailey (1983), is now much more focused on un-
derstanding the importance of the structural prop-
erties of archaeological records, and the implica-
tions these have for the building and evaluation of 
archaeological theories. Much attention has been 
focused on the problems encountered in operation-
alising social theories, particularly those sourced to 
social/cultural anthropology, and the technical and 
theoretical challenges practitioners face in adapt-
ing those theories to archaeological contexts. but I 
think that it would be fair comment that no current 
body of archaeological theory (or indeed source of 
inspiration for theory), not even evolutionary the-
ory, is immune from such phenomenological (and 
ultimately ontological) considerations. the history 
of archaeology (particularly discussions about the 
inertia of tradition) helps explain why evidence of 
archaeologists adapting those theories is very thin 
on the ground, with practitioners either ignoring 
or explaining away the many points where things 
don’t fit. The great cognitive plausibility of existing 
approaches makes this possible. Sometimes this is 
explicit, but most often it’s implicit, a product of 
the last one hundred and fifty years of disciplinary 
history that now seems natural and completely un-
remarkable.
the hierarchy is straightforward. theories (or 
more correctly sets of a priori assumptions) have 
such strong cognitive plausibility as a means of un-
derstanding the present and linking archaeological 
knowledge with other types of knowledge about 
human beings, that it makes methodological short-
comings seem pretty inconsequential. Meaning has 
been established in conventional terms – who cares 
if it lacks methodological virtue, or indeed if it is 
categorically at odds with the structural properties 
of the data under review? Hence not much of a fo-
cus on adapting or ‘working through’ the theories 
we have to hand, even thought these practical mea-
sures of ‘hammering out’ difficulties provide a vi-
able and creative basis of theory building. Instead 
archaeological theories most often are borrowed 
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pological theory needs a significant archaeological 
contribution, even though it need not necessarily be 
built only by archaeologists. It is also interesting to 
consider that while we spend much of our time ex-
ploring the problems of adapting social theory to 
archaeological phenomena (usually seeking to deal 
with short-term issues), we are still largely bereft of 
theories that operate at the mid and long terms, the 
very things that archaeologists are supposed to have 
a mortgage on.
this absence raises the questions of what those 
theories might be like, and whether archaeologists 
should be the ones to build them. I can’t offer any 
sensible answers here, but it is worth making a fi-
nal observation. the history of archaeology dem-
onstrates the value of archaeologists seeking in-
spiration and theoretical insights from wherever 
they might. the source of theories is not the issue 
here (although I believe as time passes and more 
archaeological theories are built that archaeology 
might become a more popular source). the issue 
turns on what archaeologists do with the theories 
or perspectives they deploy. Given the distinctive-
ness of archaeological records as records of human 
action I think that these imported theories have to 
change and be adapted. I also think that those new 
archaeological theories should then be reapplied to 
their source areas. the effects of that might be ex-
tremely interesting! 
5. A few concluding remarks
I began this discussion by stressing the importance 
of theory building as distinct from theory borrow-
ing. It seems to me that a vital part of this process is 
critical self-reflection about the ‘taken-for-granteds’ 
of archaeological approaches and practices, the cur-
rently privileged, unexamined assumptions which 
power much of archaeological practice and link ar-
chaeological knowledge with other types of knowl-
edge about human beings. One important site of 
critical self-reflection has to do with antinomies that 
lie at the root of presently divergent views about 
the nature and meaning of archaeological data, in 
fact about the nature and meaning of archaeology as 
a discipline. Critical self-reflection about these an-
tinomies carries clear implications for the building 
of archaeological theory at all levels. the history of 
archaeology has a vital role to play in this process 
of reflection and of re-imagining the nature and pur-
pose of archaeology.
In this paper I have been careful not to argue that 
disputes among archaeologists would be resolved 
by proposing a single view of the goals of archaeol-
ogy or the conditions of its practice. I have also de-
that archaeologists are going to have to do this for 
themselves against significant opposition from both 
inside and outside the discipline. Can the history of 
archaeology help us move forward?
4. Theory-building: a way to effect change and to 
create community?
I think that the history of archaeology can foster 
change in several ways. For example it can demon-
strate that archaeology is a product of its history and 
allow us to follow the implications this has for the 
psychology of research in our discipline. It can al-
low us to probe deeper into disciplinary epistemol-
ogy and metaphysics to more clearly understand the 
mechanics of plausibility and the status of theoreti-
cal knowledge in archaeology. It can also support a 
more open discussion of the relationships between 
archaeology and other cognate disciplines. but how 
to put these possibilities into practice?
For a start we can make archaeological data more 
consequential. by paying attention to the struc-
tural properties of archaeological phenomena, and 
by answering basic questions about them such as: 
‘what are the observable (hence analysable) units 
of time?’ archaeologists can then take the theory 
or theories that allowed them to ask the questions, 
design the methodologies and collect the data, and 
develop them (through a process of recursive rea-
soning), so that they more closely connect with the 
empirical information we try to make sense of. this 
is much more than building Middle range theories, 
which are more often than not methodological strat-
egies. recursive reasoning can (and should) build 
theories at all levels, but it does require practitio-
ners to be properly sceptical about the validity of 
the theoretical instruments they are using, rather 
than to preserve them intact, as seems to be the cur-
rent psychology of research. In this account current 
theories act as heuristic devices, frameworks of in-
ference or analogy, as points of growth rather than 
the endpoints of ratiocination. to put it bluntly we 
need to move beyond the interestingly ambiguous, 
the highly suggestive, the superficially meaningful 
and the approaches that are conservative of existing 
ideas, and audit the effectiveness of contemporary 
theory so that we can work out what to do next.
Another practical step is to recognise that there 
is no magic body of theory lurking as yet undiscov-
ered in the social theory shelves of the library that 
can be applied directly to archaeological contexts, 
and that will make all the pain go away. that is not 
to say that the inspiration for theory might be there 
– or anywhere else. Indeed a changed psychology 
of research would indicate that higher level anthro-
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of data about human action, just how special we are 
still to find out. A reassessment of the discipline that 
recognizes this should also stress the importance of 
those data as the spur for a concomitant reassess-
ment of social and cultural theory - the very terms 
within which we seek knowledge of human nature. 
the possibilities are there and the rewards are likely 
to be great. We should proceed towards such a reas-
sessment with a sense of anticipation rather than of 
dread. let me quote richard bernstein in conclu-
sion:
When individuals sense they are living 
through a period of crisis, when foundations 
seem to be cracking and orthodoxies breaking 
up, then a public space is created in which ba-
sic questions about the human condition can be 
raised anew (1976: xiii).
liberately avoided a claim that the presence of rela-
tivisms within the conceptual and epistemological 
realms of the discipline would be eradicated by ap-
plying determinate rules of the scientific method, or 
some notion of universal rationality. this is the true 
value of a historical perspective. What I have argued 
for is that an investigation of the terms under which 
archaeological knowledge claims are produced and 
justified by the disputant parties (throughout the 
history of our discipline) will materially aid our ef-
forts to facilitate communication between them, and 
assist in the process of theory building, so that rival 
positions could be clear enough to allow informed 
judgments to be made by practitioners about their 
strengths and weaknesses.
For me the core lies in the quite recent perception 
that archaeological records comprise special kinds 
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